绿色矿冶

In order to improve the recovery rate of waste power batteries and solve the problem of unknown flow direction of spent power batteries, taking the reward and punishment mechanism as the core, the evolutionary game and prospect theory were coupled to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of power battery manufacturers, informal recyclers and the government. The influence of key parameters on the game subject was discussed, and the corresponding practical application scenarios were reflected. By change the initial supervision probability of government, the game subject of negative cooperation was judged; By adjusting the distribution proportion of subsidies or fines, the reward and punishment mechanism were optimized. The results show that the governments willingness to improve the initial supervision can accelerate the information exchange between power battery manufacturers and informal recyclers; the power battery manufacturers are passive cooperative enterprises, and the government should focus on supervising them; in the long run, it will be more conducive to the active transformation and upgrading of informal recyclers to focus the distribution proportion of subsidies on power battery manufacturers and the distribution proportion of fines on informal recyclers; increasing the risk attitude coefficient and loss aversion coefficient can speed up cooperative recovery.